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NOTES
MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN
Marxism gladly takes for itself the name of humanism. This humanism even
furnishes a justification of atheism, as if the full exaltation of man must imply the
negation of God. The affirmation of the young Marx, "Man is man's god," is in
the provocative style of a great polemicist, but, more profoundly, it is a sign of the
problematic which controls Marx's conception of man.1 The assertion is, above
all, ethical. "Man's god" is man's end, that is, the good which completes him and
gives him full reality.
This good consists, apparently, in the act in which man takes for himself the
objects which satisfy him, rather than in the objects themselves. Thus the con-
cept of praxis is fundamental. Praxis, the transformation of natural or social
matter, is the self-affirmation of man; it is the act in which man enjoys himself as
man, in his full autonomy; for man is obliged only to himself for what he is.
Praxis can be either authentic or nonauthentic. Man asserts himself in praxis,
but he can also destroy himself radically in it. Such is the meaning of "alienated
labor," a concept which is one of the keys to the manuscripts of 1844. Labor,
and therefore man himself, are radically perverted and corrupted, made strangers
to their own nature, exiles from themselves, when an individualist form of prop-
erty dominates the instruments of production. In this sense, praxis is dependent,
in its very nature and for the integrity of this nature, on social circumstances.
This is why circumstances themselves constitute the field of application and the
object of praxis. Man is causa sui by the mediation of circumstances, on which
he depends, but of which he can be master. In short, he is formed by social and
exterior forces. Later, Marx abandoned the term "alienation," too charged with
philosophical reminiscences. The idea remained. His judgments are oriented by
this idea which is never spelled out in his theory. The idea remained - a cri-
terion of the authentic and of the nonauthentic, all the more powerful because
unformulated. Even when he did battle against the notion of human nature or
against the notion of moral norms, Marx was inspired by this implicit norm of
the truly human.
I anticipate. It is only little by little that Marx became conscious of the main
lines of his anthropology. He began by being a Young Hegelian. The Hegelian-
ism which Hegel's disciples knew presented itself as a historical monism.. The
real was history, and history nothing but the self-development of the Spirit. An
all-consuming metaphysical approach absorbed the idea of progress which had
come from the eighteenth century. The dissolving force of the dialectic assured
the triumphant march of Spirit (Geist) with: which history was identified,
1. Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung, in ANNALES
FRANCO-ALLEMANDES (1866). Cf. MARX-ENGELS HISTORISCH-KIUTISCHE GESAMTAUSGABE
(hereafter abbreviated MEGA), Division I, Vol. I, pt. 1, pp. 607-21 (Frankfurt, 1927).
The formula takes its inspiration from FEUERBACH, DAS WESEN. DES CH.PISTENTUMS. :..
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These conceptions of Spirit and history controlled the Hegelians' view of
human nature. On the one hand, man tended to be defined by the Spirit, to
the point that the Young Hegelians tended to treat with disdain the material
contingencies of history. On the other hand, since Spirit was history, considera-
tion of the individual ran the risk of being eclipsed by collective reality, especially
the reality of the State. Man appeared as a collective, political being, his su-
preme realization the modern State, treated as equivalent to the kingdom of
liberty. True, the logic of these ideas was tempered for many of the Young
Hegelians by the individualistic aspirations born in the liberal battle in which
they were engaged.
The exaggeratedly speculative aspect of Hegelianism provoked reactions such
as the historical school of law of Gustav Hugo, which contrasted "the positive"
to "the rational" and opposed "history" to "reason." Against this emphasis on
existence and on history, Marx invoked Hegelian rationalism. In an article in
1842 he scornfully and violently attacked Hugo's abandonment of reason in favor
of an irrational history and asserted the primacy of the rational in reality.2
Soon Marx himself was to break with Hegelianism, but the breach was never
total. His philosophy continued to rest on the Hegelian postulate that reason
and history are identical.
With his sense of the concrete and his increasing consciousness of social and
political problems, Marx had become increasingly dismayed by the orgy of ab-
stractions of the Young Hegelians. Beginning in 1843 he undertook a critical
examination of Hegel's philosophy of law. For "reality" Hegel substituted
"unreal" entities or "hypostases." His philosophy of law developed in an
a priori way which did violence to reality. In his critique Marx first depended
on Feuerbach. Then, thanks to the French socialists and Engels, whom he had
met in Paris, he acquired a direct knowledge of the terrible condition of the
industrial proletariat. From this experience came the powerful ethical in-
spiration which fills his work, which cannot be ignored in evaluating his human-
ism. As a concept, justice is banished from his system and turned to derision.
As a demand, lived and living, justice is the devouring fire from which his pro-
test breaks forth. Hegelian apriorism represents for Marx the spiritualistic
process par excellence. It is, then, necessary to reject "Spirit" and, to the extent
that it involves morality, to reject morality. But at the same time there is intro-
duced into a theoretical work an ethical indignation which animates the whole
undertaking. It seems to me that this contradiction between an extraordinarily
clear and impatient conscience and the denial of the reality of conscience on the
plane of philosophical reason gives to Marxism its explosive character and its
seductive force. I speak, of course, of Marx himself, for contemporary Marxism
has generally degenerated into a heavy and soulless scholasticism.
The German Ideology (written in 1845-1846, although published only in
1932) affirms in all their originality the doctrines of historical materialism. The
reading of Stirner, had, it seems, been decisive; it had convinced Marx that, in spite
2. Marx, "Das philosophische Manifest der historischen Rechtschule," Rheinische Zeitung
(Cologne), reproduced in MEGA, Division I, Vol. I, pt. 1, pp. 252-53.
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of his materialism, Feuerbach continued to move in the Hegelian orbit. Feuerbach
had typically employed the concept of Gattungswesen (generic being), and Marx's
manuscripts of 1844 had themselves used it to a large degree. Feuerbach is now
criticized for conceiving of man as an abstract entity, a derivative of Spirit. Yet
in the measure that the identity of reason and history remains a fundamental
affirmation of Marx, the concept of Gattungswesen is maintained. It is the word,
rather than the idea, which is rejected.
Against the speculative construction of Hegelianism and its a priori character,
there is a reaction which is at the root of Marx's historical materialism. For
Marx it is a matter of starting from "real man," and the real man is he who
exercises the most elementary and ordinary activities of production and con-
sumption. This starting point, of course, implies an epistemological viewpoint.
It is through an examination of "real" history, and not by a deduction from con-
cepts, that one can seize history. Yet, Hegelianism is not totally erased. History
possesses a permanent and knowable structure; it is the coherent development
of a form so that adequate knowledge of the past and of the present leads to
knowledge of the future and what the future brings with it. Here, as in the
writings of 1843, the problematic of the Philosophy of Right of Hegel has
exercised its influence.
Praxis is now, however, at the center of Marx's analysis of man.3 Praxis is set
out as man's characteristic activity. It consists in transforming the world in
order to satisfy fundamental needs. In its essence it is social. It is not isolated
individuals, but the group, which works. In distinction from animal action
which is determined by instinct, human praxis is progressive. Reason is the
source of progress; but it is a reason defined by its technical object, a reason whose
progressive function consists in the ceaseless invention of new instruments, accord-
ing to the demands of the transforming praxis in which it is incorporated. Marxist
man is entirely homo faber, and his reason creates instruments in the service of the
needs which are the motives of praxis. Man is, then, committed to a process of
constant transformation. But in transforming nature, he transforms himself, for
he is entirely determined by labor and by the product of his labor. Once the
first needs of man have been satisfied, the very evolution of labor and its products
engenders new needs which demand satisfaction.
But we have not yet reached the decisive factor, and Marxism is not yet
reducible to a purely technological concept of man. I have said that praxis is
entirely social. To each kind of instrument of production there corresponds a
structure of the human group or of the social organization of labor. In the most
primitive societies, where man lives on what he gathers, everyone, man or woman,
young or old, engages in all the productive activities, which are limited in num-
ber and are relatively undifferentiated. But an irreversible process, tied to
technical progress itself, leads humanity to an ever increasing division of labor.
This division of labor, a necessary phenomenon of the development of technique,
constitutes at the same time a kind of original catastrophe. Such is the ambi-
3. The major text on praxis is Theses on Feuerbach, an appendix to THE GERMAN
IDEOLOGY.
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guity of Marxist history: it brings both the good and the evil under the
heading of necessary elements. The division of labor is a step forward for reason,
and yet Marx speaks with nostalgia of the primitive community and its absolute
equality. At the same time, on the horizon of this explanation, may be glimpsed
the outline of the Hegelian concept of dialectical unity, which goes from an un-
differentiated state to differentiation only to regain itself in reconciliation. Thus,
of necessity, inexorable change only succeeds in stifling ethical egalitarianism.
With this division of labor, indeed, a rupture occurs in the community itself.
It divides into antagonistic groups. The weak are crushed and yoked by the
strong. Thus Engels will say that the first great historical defeat was that of
woman. Henceforth, the fundamental law of society is that of master and slave,
or the law of the class struggle.
The reasoning of Marx implies a selection among a whole series of options.
The first, doubtless inspired by the Hegelian concept of dialectic, consists in iden-
tifying every differentiation with antagonism. The second, which recalls the
eighteenth century, supposes that the major motive of human action is self-
interest. In the primitive community, still undifferentiated, there is a common
interest, i.e., the interest of everyone converges unconsciously toward the single
common good. With the breakup of society into classes, the individuals cease
to be moved by the interest of the whole. Their interests are particular. They
are the interests of classes; they are egoistic interests, violently opposed to each
other.
One understands why, in the eyes of Marx, the process of the division of
labor finds its end in the phenomenon of the appropriation of the instruments of
production. A master exists from the day when the instruments of production
are appropriated in an egoistic and exclusive manner and the slaves are left to
manipulate them. The slave is the alienated being, frustrated in the roots of his
being, since his labor and its fruits are no longer his own but for another; for
man is his labor. One can even say that man no longer exists: there are only
masters and slaves engaged in a battle to the death. A radical pessimism marks
this vision of history, past and present.
Yet this pessimism galvanizes the will to reverse the course of history in an
equally radical manner, and it is accompanied by a romantic exaltation of vio-
lence. The struggle is presented as the principal motive of historical progress.
The interests of the masters make them conservative, maintainers of the status
quo from which they profit. In opposition, those who are exploited are led to
find in the new instruments of production the arms of liberation. Here, in
fact, a "law" comes to the rescue with a messianic hope which polarizes Marxist
history. By their very nature the :instruments of production irresistibly invoke a
social and economic structure corresponding to them. The process can be
checked; but it cannot be prevented. It is thus that the bourgeoisie, the class
appropriate -to the beginning of the industrial era, has supplanted the feudal
class which ruled in a predominantly agricultural time. In -a vast fresco Marx
retraces the different phases of history. Turning out the masters, the slaves of
history become masters in their turn; the exploited become the exploiters; and
so on up to our day, when the present exploiters will be driven from power by a
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new class. The development of these alterniate waves is a replica of the succes-
sion of empires as Hegel had painted it.: The purpose of the fresco is to serve
as background for the episodes of modem history.
Yet, while being treated as a prolongation of the past, the modem situation is
regarded as qualitatively new. According to the scansion of a dramatic move-
ment which has been increasingly and ceaselessly amplified, the antagonism of
the classes has increased and been exacerbated in the measure that history has
advanced. Formerly, society was composed of a plurality of classes. Today contra-
diction appears in an extremely pure form. The contrast takes shape with logical
symmetry. Two classes are face to face. They -are contradictory to each other.
They are the capitalist class and the industrial proletariat. Modem, industry, by
reason of the technical structure of its large enterprises, necessarily requires col-
lectivist institutions and at the same time provides the means to realize them.
Private property becomes an anachronism :in the industrial age and constitutes
a handicap to progress. The objective conditions are then set so that the pro-
letarian class may turn out its exploiters and take in its hands the reins of
power. A monotonous return to the alternations of violence? Not at all, but a
decisive qualitative leap. Up to now revolutions were always to the advantage of
minorities, which took the place of other privileged minorities.. This time, the
revolution will be of the masses, of the immense majority. The proletariat repre-
sents and recapitulates the whole of humanity, and that is why its victories will
be the victory, and even the birth, of man. We are. then at the threshold of so-
cialism and communism, which constitute the true humanism because they bring
about the creation of man. Man appears here as the product of his own history.
After centuries of humiliation he takes his own destiny in his hands, and. to speak
accurately, it is only this taking in hand of 'destiny. which constitutes. his true
history. This thesis is taken -up lyrically in the -Manifesto of 1848,. and, .on -this
foundation, Capital undertakes to demonstrate that the -structure of capitalism
is founded on exploitation. There is nothing,..then, good to be drawn from cap-
italism, whose contradictions proclaim its* imminent -disappearance and at the
same time the victory of socialism.
Considered in the perspective of The German Ideology, Marxism seems to be
a form of historicism. Man is essentially labor and -the product of -his labor.; he
is, therefore, implicated in a process which is one of constant transformation....We
can no longer, it seems, speak of human nature in any rigorous sense, inasmuch
as labor, viewed historically, implies -the division of man into classes. What exists,
at a particular moment in time, is a slave, a serf, a proletarian, a soldier, a noble,
a merchant, a capitalist. A complete relativism is. the result; the'unity of humnan
nature is dissolved. Only a nominalist view of. history has validity. The image of
man becomes an image of a succession of heterogeneous beings,- each of whom
differs essentially from the predecessor who .has prepared his arrival. Human
nature is essentially determined by variable. historic. coordinates., Time, as suc-
cession and as the factor of the many,, is at .the root of an..irreducible meta-
physical pluralism. - . . .:
Yet, this result. which seems to follow from Marx's historicism is compen-
sated for, and even neutralized, by the affirmation. that, history is. reason. Essence,
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as an intelligible structure, appeared emptied and destroyed. It is now surrep-
titiously reintroduced, but under a heading which is programmatic, or if you like,
messianic and eschatological. The flow of time with the dispersion which it
implies is crossed by a design which is rational, homogeneous, and permanent.
It is still true that one can no longer speak of human nature in the sense of an
intelligible unity which deploys its possibilities by bringing them to realization
in various ways in time; but the time of history is considered as a time in which
there is an increase of the homogeneous sort which a living organism experiences,
a progressive realization of an idea or a plan. This ordered increase is reason.
In this reintroduction of essence, one may no longer, it is true, speak of
ontological structures thrown into temporal existence in order to be successively
realized. It is time itself, as history, which constitutes a structure or essence. If
all the individual humans in the course of time are considered, it might still be
said that their diversity prevents consideration of a single common and identical
essence. Yet these individuals are not completely separated from reason, inas-
much as reason is considered to be the totality of individuals in evolution. This
totality is the imposition of a kind of logical form on the becoming of history;
in relation to the totality, individuals, or even particular groups, become epi-
phenomenal. In themselves, events, episodes, individuals in history can only be
the object of a nominalist consideration. They are brought into 'the sphere of
reason only when, thanks to dialectic, they appear as moments of the totality.
Through them, in effect, is deployed the inexorable, structured increase of history
which is reason. Events and individuals are not reason; they are the place
where reason appears, and this distinction between reason and its place of de-
ployment is significant.
Marxist historicism admits, with Hegel, that the real is rational. This admis-
sion is not an affirmation that the historical real is itself intelligible in the measure
that it is being; it is only to profess the radical immanence of reason in becoming.
In the becoming the logical process is deployed, and this process is the self-
building of reason. Suddenly, Becoming is not only justified, but even deified.
In this perspective, man, product of History, is its raison d'Etre, or, we might say,
its formal cause, inasmuch as he is the very structure of this raison d'8tre. The plan
which is realized in history is social man. The climax is an identification of man,
history, and reason.
This identification results in a humanism, and yet there is something
paradoxical in it. While proclaiming that man is the center and end of
history, it takes refuge in generalities or turns to a utopia, when there is a ques-
tion of making its content definite. Why is there this turning to generalities and
utopias? It is because abstract generalities are possible as long as reason must
realize itself only through a concrete reality which is not itself considered to
be intelligible. At the same time it may be understood how this kind of reason
in fieri, this convergence of history toward man, could easily serve as a kind
of disguise for ethical inspiration. Marxist historicism may thus be considered
as the mythical formulation of a humanism which is, above all, ethical.
Relativism and the mythical identification of history with reason involve each
other in the historicist conception of Marxism. It is significant that the two Marx-
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ist thinkers who have most insisted on historicism have each emphasized one of
of these two aspects. Anthony Gramsci, influenced by Croce, has tried to bring
out the dialectical structure of history.4 At the same time, he has been impressed
by the perspective of an end for history which Marx had inherited from .the
Hegelian system. In Gramsci, man appears in his very structure as the ceaseless-
ly modified resultant of a polygon of technical and economic forces which are
themselves in a state of constant transformation. In particular, in reaction to the
materialism of Bukharin, Gramsci has attempted to substitute for the science
of nature the science of man and of history, since these sciences are more con-
formable to the dialectical notion of reason, more conformable to that becoming
which is inscribed in reason itself.
George LukAcs has a point of departure even closer to the vision of Hegel.S
He is especially careful to set out the systematic character of reason in the sense
in which German idealism understood the notion of system - system as the
coherent, rational totality flowing from an a priori principle. History or reason
is essentially totality. But what is the generative principle, or more exactly,
what is the self-generating principle, of this totality? In other words, what is the
principle which is a substitute for the synthetic judgment a priori or Spirit? The
new principle is the class of totality, or the Proletariat. The Proletariat of Luk6cs
is no longer, then, a simple sociological notion, derived from experience, but this
notion transferred to the rank of an a priori metaphysical category. By making
this transfer LukAcs believes that he has completely liberated the principle of
"modem" philosophy, the principle of immanence. But what he has not ob-
served is that, if Spirit held a residue of transcendence, then the Proletariat, as
an artificially privileged category, is only a mythical name for the same tran-
scendence. The same aporia may be noted in Gramsci: the privileged subject of
the dialectical praxis is, for him, the Proletariat.
In this fashion Marxism, in accordance with the program of modern philoso-
phy, undertakes to exorcise the vestiges of transcendence. Its theory of ideology
is composed with the same intent. It supposes that all the activities of man -
cultural, moral, esthetic, juridical - are determined, on the human level, by the
social structure and the class relationship. No transcendental value, and conse-
quently no free value, has any longer a place. The utopian picture of the "king-
dom of liberty" is, perhaps, compensation for this absence of gratuitousness, but
it is a compensation which remains utopian.
Just as Marxism transmuted the empirical notion of the proletariat into a
metaphysical category, so Marxism has also transformed its most basic concept:
the concept of praxis, which first appears in the theses on Feuerbach in the
appendix to The German Ideology.6 Considered in its philosophical purity, the
concept of praxis is a formulation of the intellect in an idealistic fashion. It is a
conclusion of post-Kantian philosophy. Spirit is a priori; essentially active, it
4. For further development of this point, the reader may be interested in consulting my Le
nio-marxisme d' Antonio Grarsci, in Du ROMANTISME AU MARXISME 207-226 (1961).
5. See LukAcs' youthful work (later officially repudiated), GESCHICHTE UND KLASSEN-
BEWUSSTSEIN: STUDIEN UBER MARXISTIScHE DIALEKTIK (1923).
6. Cf. my La philosophie de la praxis, in Du ROMANTISME AU MARXISME 169-206 (1961).
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posits its own object: these are the foundations of the idealist position whose
consequences Fichte and Hegel developed. This development was to affirm that
the object is not really distinct from the subject; that the subject posits its object
means that the subject posits itself. Then, by virtue of the postulate of im-
manence which is at the heart of this development, "to posit" and "to posit self"
came to be understood in the strong sense of a "creation" or a "self-creation"
and to meet literally the formula of Spinoza, causa sui. At the same time - and
on this point Fichte is perhaps more radical than Hegel - it was understood
that the contemplative and speculative form of thought presupposes a real object
and, therefore, a transcendence of being in relation to thought. This understand-
ing led to the assertion of the essentially practical nature of the mind. It is the
combination of these characteristics of the practical mind which characterizes
the praxis of Marxism, and it is these qualities which make Marxism a radically
atheistic philosophy.
But the originality of Marxism, which is also the cause of its congenital ambi-
guities, arises from this: at the same time that it fulfills the tradition of idealism,
it intends to break with it. What Marx retains from idealism is the demand of
immanence and the idea of man causa sui. But he has revolted at the a priori
character of its reasoning. The only reality which he wants to recognize is con-
crete, "material," empirical reality. Hence a latent conflict lies at the interior of
Marxism between the a priori and the a posteriori; there is an incessant passing
back and forth between a concept taken in its scientific, experimental sense, and
the same concept taken in a speculative sense. Thus, at the heart of Marxism,
the concept of praxis has a fundamental ambiguity as it relates to the concept of
labor and the concept of the class war. Hence arises an illusion which often
proves deceptive: the philosophical notions of Marxism give the impression of
emerging from social and economic experience, while the economic or social con-
cepts have a significance and a dynamism which go substantially beyond their
obvious meanings. In reality, however, this illusion is based on a weakness: the
absence of any distinction between the philosophic and the scientific. In sum,
Marxism results in a inelange of science and philosophy which bears the imprint
of the age of Auguste Comte.
It is by an analysis of praxis, as affirmation of immanence, that the opposi-
tion of Marxism to religion may be understood. In the self-affirmation of praxis,
man owes what he is only to himself; he depends on no one, on nothing tran-
scendent. He is his own creator, he is the provider of his own good, so that the
cause and the mode of acquiring this good are essential components of this good
itself. Consequently, Marx takes away the notion of creation and, so doing, any
ontological dependence on a transcendent God. This way of putting the prob-
lem has, indeed, been conditioned by the Lutheran theology of man as a sinner
situated in opposition to God. 7 In this earlier theology what is given to one is
taken from the other: to affirm God is to annihilate man, and vice versa. In
this perspective, Marxist humanism could be considered as the prolongation of
a movement of protest and the revenge of degraded man, a movement prepared
7. I have analyzed this problematic in my L'ATRIEISME DU JEUNE MARX ET SES ORIGINES
HiG-LIENNES (1959).
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in the eighteenth century and already vigorously formulated in Kant's Religion
Within the Limits of Reason Alone and in Hegel.
It is also the postulate of immanence, yoked to the postulate of materialism,
which accounts for the incapacity of Marxism to develop a significant political
ethic. The political order, by nature ideological, is not subordinate to any
higher norm. Marx had, indeed, felt that the Hegelian State, which was con-
ceived as an entity above society, had a purely logical existence as a being of
reason. But he stopped with a denial of its necessity. As the State continued to
exist, he was reduced to the disastrously impoverished concept of the State as
an instrument of domination in the hands of the governing class. The political
order became a simple reflection of class struggle; its law was, then, violence.
What is the criterion permitting a judgment on the use of violence? There is no
other criterion than the interests of the proletariat, that is, of the Party, which is
the "conscience" of the proletariat. Here, again, it appears that the Marxist
concept of the proletariat is a myth which testifies in its way to the irrepressible
demands of transcendence.
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